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Abstract 
This paper introduces a new regulatory concept: the independent profit-maximising regulatory agent, as a possible 
model for regulating network industries where complex demand interdependencies, in particular demand 
complementarities, make traditional methods of regulation difficult.  We derive a simple theoretical network 
model with differentiated demands and explore alternative competitive and regulatory strategies.  We show that 
the employment of an independent profit-maximising agent may offer a partial solution to the problem of network 
regulation, yielding outcomes which involve all parties pursuing their own interests yet are relatively desirable to 
both firms and society. 
JEL #s:  D43, L13, R48 
Keywords:  Networks, Regulation, Independent Agent 
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1. Introduction 
Economists know that where there are two perfectly complementary goods or services each provided by a single 
(monopoly) firm, the overall price to the consumer will be lower if the firms are allowed to collude on price than 
if they set prices independently (Cournot, 1838).  In such situations price collusion should be preferred to the 
alternative of independent pricing: both society and the firms involved will be better-off.  This sort of reasoning 
underlies, for instance, the „block exemption‟ from the relevant provisions of the 1998 Competition Act given to 
multi-operator public transport pricing schemes in the UK (see Office of Fair Trading, 2002).  However, this 
conclusion may not carry over to a situation with more complicated demands.  Networks often have demand 
structures which include both complementary and substitute relationships between commodities.  Thus, 
encouraging collusion on some parts of the network may undermine the potency of potentially beneficial 
independent pricing on other parts.  Economides and Salop (1992) explore the issue of pricing on a network by 
extending Cournot‟s model of complementary monopoly.  They show that breaking up a monopoly, even in the 
presence of substitutes, can result in higher prices.  However, this is dependent on the form the monopoly split 
takes.  McHardy (2006) addresses a related question: if collusion is ruled-out, how much competition is required 
amongst rival (substitute) producers of complementary goods in order to yield a welfare improvement relative to a 
situation of perfect collusion between the complementary producers.  It is shown, in the two complementary good 
case at least, that relatively little competition in one or other of the complementary goods is required to achieve 
this.   
 Of course, the general idea that collusion can be beneficial is at the very least somewhat counter-intuitive, and 
there is a widespread tendency to introduce a regulator to control pricing across a network, especially where the 
services are all operated by a single monopolist.  An alternative approach is to enforce a vertical separation in the 
industry by inserting a (supposedly) competitive layer between the network provider and the consumer. This was 
done in the early days of mobile telephony in the UK, when Cellnet and Vodaphone were obliged to sell to the 
public through service providers, but did not prove to be a very satisfactory solution (see Cave and Williamson, 
1996, Section VI, for further details).  The regulator is typically a government agency, such as the Federal 
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Communications Commission in the USA or the Office of the Rail Regulator in the UK, and in these 
circumstances even an active, pro-competition regulator is likely to be seen as the „dead hand‟ of the state.  The 
rising importance of network industries in modern economies coupled with the difficulties of applying traditional 
regulatory approaches makes this area one of considerable interest for policy-makers.  This paper introduces a 
different type of regulatory agent (that we have not seen before in the literature), one who operates much more 
within the industry and who may even take a share of the industry‟s profits.  We examine how the employment of 
an independent agent may provide a useful instrument for regulators in separating the pricing decisions on 
complementary and substitute aspects of a network: allowing collusive pricing on complementary aspects of the 
network without compromising the benefits of independent pricing amongst substitutes.   
 The following section introduces a simple network model with differentiated demands in the context of a 
monopoly or perfectly collusive duopoly (we use the two terms interchangeably).  In Section 3, the equilibria 
under three regimes are derived and compared: a network monopoly which (i) is unregulated (ii) faces an 
independent profit-maximising agent who sets the price on the cross-network commodity bundles, taking an 
arbitrarily small share of the associated profit (iii) faces an agent, but the agent takes all profit on the cross-
network commodity bundles.  Section 4 repeats the analysis for the case of independent (non-collusive) network 
duopoly.  Section 5 examines the relative size of equilibrium values of key variables under each regime.  Section 
6 is a conclusion. 
2. THE MODEL 
Consider a simple demand system where consumption involves two commodities X and Y in fixed and (for 
simplicity and without loss of generality) equal proportions.  Whilst fixed proportions is a reasonable assumption 
in the context of networks, it is easily shown that given this assumption along with (i) the fact that all agents 
maximise objective functions over a complete bundle of commodities rather than an individual commodity and 
(ii) the symmetry of the model, the further assumption of equal proportions changes nothing within the model.  
Let there be two distinct versions of each commodity, 𝑋𝑖  and 𝑌𝑖  (𝑖 = 1,2), with firm m producing the combination 
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(𝑋𝑚 , 𝑌𝑚 ) (𝑚 = 1,2).  Assuming that the distinct versions of each commodity are interchangeable (but not perfect 
substitutes), we refer to commodity bundle (𝑋𝑚 , 𝑌𝑚 ) as the single-network bundle and (𝑋𝑚 , 𝑌𝑛) (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2), 
as the cross-network bundle.  For example, transport companies provide interchangeable tickets (tickets which 
can be used on other companies‟ services), mobile phone service operators charge different prices for access to 
their own network relative to other service providers‟ networks, Microsoft and Apple both produce operating 
systems and software which are interchangeable to some extent and there are now a few companies who offer 
broadband/telephone-TV hybrid deals as well as the stand-alone products.   
 For simplicity, we denote demand for commodity bundle (𝑋𝑖 , 𝑌𝑗 ) as 𝑄𝑖𝑗 .  Let demand 𝑄𝑖𝑗  be linear in its own 
price and also in the prices of all the possible alternative (substitute) commodity bundles: 
  𝑄𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑃𝑖𝑗 +  𝑃𝑚𝑛𝑚𝑛 ≠𝑖𝑗 . (𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2)               (1) 
 In this specification, 𝛽, which is related to the partial own-price elasticity of demand, is common for each 
commodity bundle as is the unit cross-price co-efficient which is common across all alternative commodity 
combinations to 𝑖𝑗: all the alternative commodity bundles are equally good substitutes.  Of course, the unit cross-
price coefficient indicates the degree to which services are differentiated and might realistically be expected to 
feature as a strategic choice variable of a firm rather than be parametric and equal to one as it is here.  It is 
important to note, however, that the system of demand functions satisfies integrability and hence is supported by a 
utility function. 
 Given (1), the following restriction is required to ensure a system of gross substitutes: 
  𝛽 > 3.                    (2) 
 Having established the demand structure for the model we now briefly turn our attention to costs.  The central 
concern of this paper is with the relative prices, outputs and profits under different regulatory regimes.  For 
simplicity we assume marginal cost is constant and equal to zero.  Given that the structure of the model (the 
number of physical commodities) is a constant over all regimes, fixed costs play no part in the relative profits, 
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prices or quantities across regimes and are also assumed to be zero.  This assumes away possible co-ordination 
costs under collusive regimes and assumes the introduction of the regulatory agent (whose role involves making 
only price decisions – it produces no physical outputs) is at zero fixed cost.   
 The case of first-best social welfare maximisation is a trivial one.  With zero marginal costs a social planner 
will set the price for each commodity equal to zero.  Thus in all regimes revenue, costs and hence profits are all 
zero;  hence, from (1), 𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝑠 = 𝛼, (∀𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2).  However, reference to a benchmark first-best variable (price, 
quantity or surplus) is of limited use in the present case as with the inter-related demands, changing from one 
regime to another, prices and quantities may move in different directions in different sectors of the network 
making general conclusions about welfare difficult.  Given our assumptions about the demand structure (in 
particular symmetry) welfare is not path dependent, but for our purposes the expressions are too complex to work 
with.  However, all the equilibrium variables of interest are multiplicative, and of the same order (for each 
variable across the regimes), in 𝛼.  Hence, any absolute comparisons with the first-best are as arbitrary as 𝛼.  
Since in the absence of negative externalities, more consumption is generally privately and socially better than 
less, we construct a social preference ranking for the regimes which is non-decreasing in the total consumption 
across the network.  The (weighted) average price across the network is also included in the social preference 
ranking: regimes with lower average prices are at least weakly preferred.  The emphasis on total quantity is 
appealing for a number of reasons.  Indeed, an “output-related profits levy” which would reward faster growth of 
output was one regulatory mechanism considered when British Telecom was privatised in 1984, and of course a 
(weighted) average price is the focus of the „RPI–X‟ regulation that was actually introduced.  Alternatively, 
maximising passenger-miles was adopted as a target by London Transport (see Glaister and Collings, 1978, and 
the references therein).  It was also put forward by Sir Peter Parker, when Chairman of British Rail, in his 1978 
Haldane Lecture.   
 The social welfare function can be summarised by (subscripts on S denote partial derivatives): 
  𝑆(𝑄 , 𝑃 )  𝑆𝑄 > 0, 𝑆𝑄 𝑄 < 0, 𝑆𝑃 < 0, 𝑆𝑃 𝑃 < 0.              (3) 
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where 𝑄  is the total consumption on the network and 𝑃  is the (weighted) average commodity bundle price.  Given 
the above discussion, we suggest that the weight on the former term would be strictly greater than that on the 
latter.  We refer to a regime which improves both terms, 𝑆(+, −), as strictly superior or preferred, whilst one 
regime is weakly superior or preferred to another regime if 𝑆(+, +), i.e. total consumption increases but (despite 
this) there is a rise in the (weighted) average price.   
 With the theoretical framework of the paper established, we now proceed to consider the relative merits of two 
different regulatory regimes against the free market case under, first, network monopoly in which a single firm (or 
two perfectly collusive firms) provide(s) all the services on the network, and second, non-collusive network 
duopoly, in which two rival firms offer differentiated single-network operations which can be combined into two 
cross-network operations.   
3. PERFECT COLLUSION OR NETWORK MONOPOLY 
In this section we consider the equilibrium prices and outputs in a situation of network monopoly where all 
commodity bundles (𝑋𝑖 , 𝑌𝑗 ) (𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2) are provided by a single profit-maximising firm or by two perfectly 
collusive firms with firm m producing (𝑋𝑚 , 𝑌𝑚 )  𝑚 = 1,2 .  To maintain general applicability of the modelling 
framework, we allow the network to be a monopoly or perfectly collusive duopoly, as appropriate to the case 
being considered.  There is a possible distinction to be made between the network monopoly and perfectly 
collusive network duopoly in terms of the optimal choices of the number of commodity variants and the degree of 
differentiation between them.  However, in this paper we treat them as a constant across all regimes.   
 In this section, we are interested in examining three regimes.  The first regime (M1) is the free-market case in 
which the unregulated monopolist sets all prices to maximise profit across the network.  In the context of this 
paper, this is equivalent to two single-network providers being allowed to collude on all prices.  The advantage of 
such a policy is that it acts against the negative cross-network externalities in the model: private incentives are, to 
some extent, aligned with social incentives in that by colluding on prices on this part of the network firms 
decrease price, raising profit and also social welfare.  Such benefits would not be achieved if the social planner 
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were to insist on separating the network monopoly into two single-network operations or to eliminate all collusion 
on pricing between two single-network operators.  Clearly this policy does not come without its drawbacks: by 
allowing collusion on the network or by not splitting up the network monopolist, the potential gains in terms of 
decreased prices through competition between single-network commodity bundles is lost.  In the second regime 
(M2), the social planner employs an independent agent who is responsible for setting the price for the cross-
network commodity bundles (𝑋𝑖 , 𝑌𝑗 )  (𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 = 1,2) and who maximises profit which is assumed to be an 
arbitrarily small proportion of total profit on the cross-network operation.  An independent, profit maximising 
agent is again employed in the third regime (M3).  However, in this case the agent keeps all the cross-network 
profit.  As in the case of M1, it is assumed that the social planner is unable or unwilling to either prevent collusion 
between a network duopoly or split up a network monopoly.  In examining regimes M2 and M3, we are asking 
whether, in such cases, the employment of an agent can yield an improvement upon a situation where firms are 
simply allowed to collude on all commodity bundle prices.   
 Beginning with regime M1, the network monopolist‟s profit, in general terms, is given by:  
  Π𝑀1 =  𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑄𝑚𝑚 + 𝑃𝑥𝑚=1,2  𝑄𝑚𝑛𝑚≠𝑛=1,2 .               (4) 
where for ease of reference and given the symmetry of the model, 𝑃𝑥(= 𝑃𝑚𝑛 = 𝑃𝑛𝑚 ; 𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2) is the price of 
the cross-network commodity bundle.  The choice of this simplifying notation on cross-network price becomes 
apparent in Section 4.  However, it is important to note that the imposition of this symmetry at this point has no 
bearing on the solutions given the general symmetry of the model and the assumption of monopoly, and later a 
single agent.   
 Using (1) and maximising (4) with respect to 𝑃𝑚𝑚  and 𝑃𝑥  yield the following equilibrium single- and cross-
network prices: 
  𝑃𝑚𝑚
𝑀1 = 𝑃𝑥
𝑀1 = 𝛼/[2 𝛽 − 3 ].  (𝑚 = 1,2)              (5) 
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Hence, the network monopolist does not discriminate on price across the different commodity bundles.  This 
result has to do with the symmetry of the model.  Substituting (5) into (1) yields the following equilibrium 
expressions for quantity demanded of single- and cross-network commodity bundles: 
  𝑄𝑚𝑚
𝑀1 = 𝑄𝑚𝑛
𝑀1 = 𝛼/2.   (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2)              (6) 
It follows that the (weighted) average, and in this case common, price and the total quantity consumed of the 
commodity bundles under regime M1 are, respectively:  
  𝑃 𝑀1 = 𝛼  2 𝛽 − 3   ,                 (7a) 
  𝑄 𝑀1 = 2𝛼.                 (7b) 
Finally, using (5) and (6) in (4), we have the equilibrium aggregate profit under regime M1: 
  Π 
𝑀1
= 𝛼2  𝛽 − 3  .                (7c) 
 We now consider the second monopoly regime, M2, in which an agent is employed by the social planner to set 
the price on the cross-network commodity bundle.  Pricing is simultaneous and the agent seeks to maximise profit 
over cross-network demands, from which it gets an arbitrarily small fixed proportion, 𝜅.  The monopolist now sets 
𝑃𝑚𝑚  and the agent sets 𝑃𝑚𝑛  (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2), in order to maximise their respective profit functions:  
  ΠM =  𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚=1,2 𝑄𝑚𝑚 + (1 − 𝜅)  𝑃𝑚𝑛𝑚≠𝑛=1,2 𝑄𝑚𝑛 ,            (8a) 
  ΠA = 𝜅  𝑃𝑚𝑛𝑚≠𝑛=1,2 𝑄𝑚𝑛 .               (8b) 
Solving the maximisation problems simultaneously yields: 
  𝑃𝑚𝑚 = 𝛼(1 + 𝛽 − 𝜅)/{2  𝛽 − 1)
2 + 𝜅 − 2  ,  
  𝑃𝑥 = 𝛼𝛽/{2  𝛽 − 1)
2 + 𝜅 − 2  .    
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Taking limits yields the following equilibrium single- and cross-network prices under regime M2: 
  lim𝜅→0 𝑃𝑚𝑚
M2 = 𝛼(1 + 𝛽)/{2  𝛽 − 1)2 − 2  ,                          (9a) 
  lim𝜅→0 𝑃𝑥
M2 = 𝛼𝛽/{2  𝛽 − 1)2 − 2  .              (9b) 
It is important to note that this regime introduces strategic interaction between the firm(s) and the agent, making 
the case distinct from one in which 𝜅 = 0 is imposed in the general profit functions (8).  The latter simply returns 
the network monopoly case, M1.   
 Substituting (9) into (1), the equilibrium quantities in regime M2 are given by: 
  𝑄𝑚𝑚
M2 = 𝛼/2,                           (10a) 
  𝑄𝑥
M2 = 𝛼𝛽(𝛽 − 1)/{2  𝛽 − 1)2 − 2  .                        (10b) 
Finally, the (weighted) average price, the total quantity of commodity bundles consumed across the network and 
aggregate profit accruing to the network monopolist, are, respectively: 
  P 𝑀2 = 𝛼{[ 𝛽 − 1)2 − 2  𝛽 + 1 + 𝛽2 𝛽 − 1 }/{2[ 𝛽 − 1)2 − 2   2𝛽 − 1  𝛽 − 1 − 2 },     (11a) 
  Q 𝑀2 = 𝛼{ 2𝛽 − 1  𝛽 − 1 − 2}/{(𝛽 − 1)2 − 2},          (11b) 
  Π 
𝑀2
= 𝛼2{[ 𝛽 − 1)2 − 2  𝛽 + 1 + 𝛽2 𝛽 − 1 }/{2  𝛽 − 1)2 + 2 2 .         (11c) 
Comparison of (11) and (7) yields the following proposition. 
Proposition 1.
1
 (i) The network monopolist strictly prefers the free market regime M1 over the agent regime M2: 
Π 
M1
> Π 
M2
.  (ii) The social planner strictly prefers regime M2 over regime M1: 𝑆 𝑄 𝑀2, 𝑃 𝑀2 ≻ 𝑆 𝑄 𝑀1 , 𝑃 𝑀1 .   
The monopolist and social planner, not surprisingly, have opposing rankings of the two regimes. 
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 The third monopoly regime, M3, involves an agent who sets the price on the cross-network commodity 
bundles, but keeps the entire share of profit on this part of the network, i.e. 𝜅 = 1.  Imposing 𝜅 = 1 in (8), (9) and 
(10), yields the following equilibrium prices and quantities: 
  𝑃𝑚𝑚
𝑀3 = 𝑃𝑚𝑛
𝑀3 = 𝛼/{2 𝛽 − 2 },   (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2)                     (12a) 
  𝑄𝑚𝑚
𝑀3 = 𝑄𝑚𝑛
𝑀3 = 𝛼(𝛽 − 1)/{2 𝛽 − 2 }.                        (12b) 
Note that under M3, like M1, there is symmetry in single- and cross-network prices and outputs. 
 Substituting (12) in (8) with 𝜅 = 1 yields the following equilibrium average price, total quantity of commodity 
bundles consumed across the network and profit for the monopolist, respectively: 
  P M3 = 𝛼/{2(𝛽 − 2)},    
  Q M3 = 2𝛼 𝛽 − 1 (𝛽 − 2 ),  
  ΠM3 = 𝛼2(𝛽 − 1)/{2 𝛽 − 2)2 . 
Note, ΠM3 captures the total profit accruing to the firm(s), excluding the agent since for our purposes, we are only 
interested in comparing profits to establish the relative benefits of each regime from the viewpoint of the firm(s) 
not the agent.  In cases M1 and M2 profit to the firms and profit across the industry are the same (only industry-
wide terms are indicated by a tilde). 
Proposition 2. (i) The network monopolist strictly prefers the agent regime M2 over the agent regime M3: 
Π 
M2
> ΠM3.  (ii) The social planner strictly prefers regime M3 over regime M2: 𝑆 𝑄 𝑀3, 𝑃 𝑀3 ≻ 𝑆 𝑄 𝑀2 , 𝑃 𝑀2 .   
Corollary 1. By Propositions 1 and 2 (i) Π 
M1
> Π 
M2
> ΠM3 and (ii) 𝑆 𝑄 𝑀3 , 𝑃 𝑀3 ≻ 𝑆 𝑄 𝑀2 , 𝑃 𝑀2 ≻
𝑆 𝑄 𝑀1 , 𝑃 𝑀1 .   
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 To summarise, so far, the preference ranking of the network monopolist over the three regimes is the reversal 
of the ranking for the social planner with the case of the agent taking all cross-network profit being the least 
favourable to the monopolist and best for the social planner, and the free-market case being best for the 
monopolist and least good for the social planner.  M2 is a compromise regime for both firm(s) and the social 
planner. 
4. NON-COLLUSIVE NETWORK DUOPOLY 
In this section, we examine the effects of introducing greater strategic interaction in the model by assuming a 
duopoly in which two separate non-collusive firms provide the substitute single-network operations, and also 
contribute to two cross-network commodities: firm m provides the m component of (i) 𝑄𝑚𝑚 , (ii) 𝑄𝑚𝑛 , and, (iii) 
𝑄𝑛𝑚  (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2).  Essentially, this section seeks to address the question, could the monopoly or perfectly 
collusive regimes in Section 3, with and without an agent, be improved upon by forcing independent (non-
collusive) pricing between the duopolists or splitting up a network monopoly? Note, when comparing regimes in 
terms of attractiveness to the firms it is now important to treat the monopoly case as a perfectly collusive duopoly 
where each firm shares half of the overall profit.  Thus a duopoly regime will be preferable from the firms‟ 
viewpoints to a monopoly (perfectly collusive) regime if profit for each firm in the former is greater than half that 
in the latter case.  
 We begin, as in section3, by considering a regime, D1, in which the duopolists operate in a free (unregulated) 
market and set their single-network and component of the cross-network commodity bundle prices independently 
and simultaneously.  Regime D2 involves the employment of an agent in the setting of the price for the cross-
network commodity bundle in such a way as to maximise its arbitrarily small share of profit on the cross-network 
operation whilst regime D3 involves employment of an agent, who retains all the profit on the cross-network 
commodity bundle. 
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 We assume each firm m sets the price of its own component, 𝑃𝑥𝑚  (𝑚 = 1,2), of the cross-network commodity 
bundle price.  Given the symmetry of demands, the cross-network commodity bundle price, 𝑃𝑥 , is the sum of these 
two component prices for both cross-network combinations:  
  𝑃𝑥 = 𝑃𝑚𝑛 =  𝑃𝑥𝑚𝑚=1,2    (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2).           (13) 
Given (13) the general expression for the profit of firm m is given by, Π𝑚
𝐷1: 
  Π𝑚
𝐷1 = 𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑄𝑚𝑚 + 𝑃𝑥𝑚 (𝑄𝑚𝑛 + 𝑄𝑛𝑚 )  𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2 .            (14) 
Using (1) and (13) in (14) and maximising with respect to 𝑃𝑥𝑚  and  𝑃𝑚𝑚  for 𝑚 = 1,2 yields the following first 
order conditions, respectively: 
  𝛼 − 2𝛽𝑃𝑚𝑚 + 𝑃𝑛𝑛 + 4𝑃𝑥𝑚 + 2𝑃𝑥𝑛 = 0,            (15a) 
  𝛼 −  1 + 2𝛽  𝑃𝑥𝑚 − 𝑃𝑥𝑛  + 2𝑃𝑚𝑚 + 𝑃𝑛𝑛 = 0,   𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2 .         (15b) 
Given the symmetry of the problem, in equilibrium, 𝑃𝑥𝑚 = 𝑃𝑥𝑛  and 𝑃𝑚𝑚 = 𝑃𝑛𝑛 , and given (13), solving (15a) and 
(15b) simultaneously yields the equilibrium expressions for the cross- and single-network commodity bundle 
prices, respectively: 
  𝑃𝑥
𝐷1 = 𝑃𝑥1
𝐷1 + 𝑃𝑥2
𝐷1 = 4𝛼/{3 2𝛽 − 5 },            (16a) 
  𝑃𝑚𝑚
𝐷1 = 𝛼  2𝛽 − 5  .              (16b) 
Using (16) in (1) yields the following equilibrium expressions for cross- and single-network demands, 
respectively: 
  𝑄𝑚𝑛
𝐷1 = 𝛼 3 ,     
  𝑄𝑚𝑚
𝐷1 = 𝛼(3𝛽 − 4) {3 2𝛽 − 5 } .    
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The (weighted) average price, total quantity and aggregate profit across the network are then, respectively: 
  𝑃 𝐷1 = 𝛼(17𝛽 − 32)/{3(2𝛽 − 5)(5𝛽 − 9)},  
  𝑄 𝐷1 = 2𝛼(5𝛽 − 9)/{3(2𝛽 − 5)},   
  Π 
𝐷1
= 2𝛼2(17𝛽 − 32)/{9 2𝛽 − 5)2 .  
Proposition 3. (i) The firms strictly prefer regime M1 over D1 and D1 over M3: Π 
M1
> Π 
D1
> ΠM3.  (ii) The 
firms prefer M2 over D1 if 𝛽 > 5.15.  (iii) The social planner strictly prefers regime M2 over regime 
D1: 𝑆 𝑄 𝑀2 , 𝑃 𝑀2 ≻ 𝑆 𝑄 𝐷1 , 𝑃 𝐷1 .  (iv) The social planner prefers regime M1 over D1 if 𝛽 > 6.00.   
Corollary 2. By Propositions 1 and 3 and if 𝛽 is sufficiently large: (i) Π 
M1
> Π 
M2
> Π 
D1
> ΠM3 and (ii) 
𝑆 𝑄 𝑀3 , 𝑃 𝑀3 ≻ 𝑆 𝑄 𝑀2 , 𝑃 𝑀2 ≻ 𝑆 𝑄 𝑀1 , 𝑃 𝑀1 ≻ 𝑆 𝑄 𝐷1, 𝑃 𝐷1 . 
This is an important result.  First, network monopoly (M1) may be preferred by society to unregulated duopoly 
(D1) if 𝛽 is sufficiently large: hence the positive effects through competition on substitute services created by 
splitting up a monopoly network are outweighed by the negative complementary externalities.  Second, for 
society, the monopoly under regulatory agent M2 is always preferable to unregulated duopoly (D1).  McHardy 
(2006) concludes that social planners wishing to make improvements upon monopoly (perfectly collusive 
complementary monopoly) should not split up the monopoly and create a situation of complementary monopoly if 
there is little prospect of separation leading to entry and competition in the production of the complementary 
goods.  Proposition 3 suggests that where such post-separation entry is unlikely, employment of a regulatory 
agent may provide a partial solution to this problem.   
  We now introduce regime D2 in which the independent agent sets the cross-network commodity bundle price 
so as to maximise its own profit: an arbitrarily small fixed proportion, 𝜅, of the profit on the cross-network 
operation. The general expression for profit on the cross-network operation is given by: 
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  Π𝑥
𝐷2 = 𝑃𝑥(𝑄𝑚𝑛 + 𝑄𝑛𝑚 )  (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2).   
of which the share to firm m and to the agent are respectively: 
  Π𝑥𝑚
𝐷2 = (1 − κ)𝑃𝑥(𝑄𝑚𝑛 + 𝑄𝑛𝑚 )/2,             (17a) 
  Π𝐴
𝐷2 = κ𝑃𝑥(𝑄𝑚𝑛 + 𝑄𝑛𝑚 )  (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2).          (17b) 
In the simultaneous price-setting scenario, the agent sets 𝑃𝑥  to maximise its profit (17b), whilst firm m sets 𝑃𝑚𝑚  to 
maximise its profit: 
  Π𝑚
𝐷2 = 𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑄𝑚𝑚 + (1 − 𝜅)𝑃𝑥(𝑄𝑚𝑛 + 𝑄𝑛𝑚 )/2 (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2).           (18) 
Substituting (6a) into (18) and maximising with respect to  𝑃𝑚𝑚 , yields the following first order condition:  
  𝑃𝑚𝑚 =  𝛼 + 𝑃𝑛𝑛 + 𝑃𝑥 3 − 𝜅  /(2𝛽)  (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2).           (19) 
Similarly, substituting (6b) into (17b) and maximising with respect to 𝑃𝑥 : 
  𝑃𝑥 = (𝛼 + 𝑃𝑚𝑚 + 𝑃𝑛𝑛 )/{2 𝛽 − 1 }.              (20) 
Solving (19) and (20) simultaneously, yields: 
  𝑃𝑚𝑚 = 𝛼(1 + 2𝛽 − 𝜅)/{2  2𝛽 − 1) 𝛽 − 1 − (3 − 𝜅)  ,  (𝑚 = 1,2)       (21a) 
  𝑃x = 𝛼(1 + 2𝛽)/{2  2𝛽 − 1) 𝛽 − 1 − (3 − 𝜅)  .          (21b) 
Taking limits yields the following expressions for the equilibrium single- and cross-network commodity bundle 
prices, respectively: 
  lim𝜅→0 𝑃𝑚𝑚
D2 = 𝛼/{2(𝛽 − 2)}, (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2).           (22a) 
  lim𝜅→0 𝑃𝑥
D2 = lim𝜅→0 𝑃𝑚𝑚
D2              (22b) 
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Substituting (22) in (1) yields the following equilibrium commodity bundle demands: 
  𝑄𝑚𝑚
𝐷2 = 𝑄𝑚𝑛
𝐷2 = 𝛼(𝛽 − 1)/{2(𝛽 − 2)},  (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2).   
The (weighted) average price, total quantity and aggregate firm (non-agent) profit under regime D2 are then, 
respectively: 
   P 𝐷2 = 𝛼/{2 𝛽 − 2) ,    
  Q 𝐷2 = 2𝛼 𝛽 − 1 (𝛽 − 2) ,  
  Π 
𝐷2
= 𝛼2(𝛽 − 1)/{ 𝛽 − 2)2 .    
Proposition 4. (i) The firms strictly prefer regime M2 over D2 and D2 over M3: Π 
𝑀2
> Π 
𝐷2
> Π𝑀3. (ii) The 
firms prefer D2 over D1 if 𝛽 > 6.68. (iii) The social planner is indifferent between regimes D2 and M3: 
𝑆 𝑄 𝐷2 , 𝑃 𝐷2 ~𝑆 𝑄 𝑀3 , 𝑃 𝑀3 . 
 Finally, we introduce regime D3, in which the independent agent keeps all profit on the cross-network bundle.  
Setting 𝜅 = 1 in (21) yields the equilibrium single- and cross-network prices, respectively: 
  𝑃𝑚𝑚
𝐷3 = 𝛼𝛽/{ 2𝛽 − 1  𝛽 − 1 − 2},    (𝑚 = 1,2)        (23a) 
  𝑃𝑥
𝐷3 = 𝛼(2𝛽 + 1)/ 2[ 2𝛽 − 1  𝛽 − 1 − 2] .           (23b) 
Substituting (23) in (1) yields the associated equilibrium commodity bundle demands: 
  𝑄𝑚𝑛
𝐷3 = 𝛼 2𝛽 + 1  𝛽 − 1 /{2[ 2𝛽 − 1  𝛽 − 1 − 2]},   (𝑚 ≠ 𝑛 = 1,2)         
  𝑄𝑚𝑚
𝐷3 = 𝛼𝛽2/{ 2𝛽 − 1  𝛽 − 1 − 2}.        
Finally, the (weighted) average price, total quantity of commodity bundles consumed and aggregate firm profit 
(excluding the agent) in regime D3 are, respectively: 
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  𝑃 𝐷3 = 𝛼 8𝛽3 − 3𝛽 − 1  2 4𝛽2 − 𝛽 − 1   2𝛽 − 1  𝛽 − 1 − 2   , 
  𝑄 𝐷3 = 𝛼 4𝛽2 − 𝛽 − 1   2𝛽 − 1  𝛽 − 1 − 2  ,   
  Π𝐷3 = 2𝛼2𝛽3/{ 2𝛽 − 1  𝛽 − 1 − 2}2 . 
Proposition 5. (i) The firms strictly prefer regimes D1 and M3 over regime D3: (Π 
𝐷1
, Π𝑀3) > Π𝐷3.  (ii) The 
social planner strictly prefers regime D3 over regime D2: 𝑆 𝑄 𝐷3, 𝑃 𝐷3 ≻ 𝑆 𝑄 𝐷2, 𝑃 𝐷2 . 
5. DISCUSSION 
The propositions of Sections 3 and 4 have provided information on rankings over six regimes for the profit-
maximising firms and for the social planner whose preferences are given by (3).  Based on these findings, we can 
generate a complete ranking for both sets of preferences.  The positions of certain regimes in the rankings are 
dependent on the level of 𝛽.  These conditional rankings are reproduced in Table 1, below.   
 First, for the firms, not surprisingly, the unregulated monopoly regime M1 is always most preferred.  However, 
it is least preferred for the social planner for sufficiently low levels of 𝛽.  If 𝛽 is sufficiently high, then regime D1 
is actually worse than M1 for the social planner: splitting up the profit-maximising network monopolist into 
independent duopoly reduces welfare.  This is a variant of the result that complementary monopoly is worse than 
monopoly.  Indeed, regime D1 is never high ranking for either the firms or the social planner.  Regime D3, on the 
other hand, is always the most preferred for the social planner and least preferred for the firms.  Regimes M3 and 
D2 are always (level) second highest ranking for the social planner, but for the firms D2 ranks well if 𝛽 is 
sufficiently large.  Finally, regime M2 is highly ranked for the firms if 𝛽 is relatively high, and is mid-ranking for 
the social planner for all 𝛽.   
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Table 1 – Firm (Non-Agent) and Social Rankings of the Six Regimes (from most to least preferred) 
𝛽 < 5.15 5.15 < 𝛽 < 6.00 6.00 < 𝛽 < 6.68 𝛽  > 6.68 
Firm 
Ranking 
Social 
Ranking 
Firm 
Ranking 
Social 
Ranking 
Firm 
Ranking 
Social 
Ranking 
Firm 
Ranking 
Social 
Ranking 
M1 D3 M1 D3 M1 D3 M1 D3 
D1 M3=D2 M2 M3=D2 M2 M3=D2 M2 M3=D2 
M2 M3=D2 D1 M3=D2 D1 M3=D2 D2 M3=D2 
D2 M2 D2 M2 D2 M2 D1 M2 
M3 D1 M3 D1 M3 M1 M3 M1 
D3 M1 D3 M1 D3 D1 D3 D1 
            Note: The social planner only weakly prefers M1 to D1 if β < 7.30. 
 However, in order to draw more insightful judgements about the various regimes, it is necessary to have some 
indication about the relative payoffs for each party (excluding the agent) in each regime.  Figures 1 to 3 illustrate 
the relative levels of firm profit, total output and the (weighted) average price, respectively.  Regime D1 is clearly 
damaging to all parties, standing out in particular in terms of high prices and low output.  From a profit point of 
view, D3 and M3 are at best around 50% of the monopoly level.  In all other cases, the price and profit variables 
converge on the unregulated monopoly M1 levels and the output variable converges on D3 from below as 𝛽 
increases.  However, in terms of output, regimes M3=D2 lie within just 3% of the D3 level (society‟s most 
preferred regime).  In terms of average price, M3=D2 are marginally worse (higher) than D3.  Finally, in terms of 
profit, regime D2 is at worst (for the firms) 75% of the monopoly level, but the percentage quickly approaches 
100% as 𝛽 increases.  In summary, D2 appears to be favourable compromises for both firms and the social 
planner, more so for the former as 𝛽 increases.   
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have explored possible partial solutions to the problem of regulating firms in a network industry 
by employing an independent profit-maximising agent.  We considered the benefits to both the firms and a social 
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planner (with preferences over output and average industry price) across alternative regulatory regimes.  The idea 
of separating a network monopolist along substitute lines, without any further intervention, was shown to be a bad 
policy from the social planner‟s view-point and also for the firms for sufficiently high levels of 𝛽 (which is related 
to the own-price elasticity).  Indeed, maintaining an unregulated monopoly or perfectly collusive duopoly on the 
network, whilst obviously best for the firm(s), may be better, too, for the social planner.  However, unless 𝛽 is 
very large, this strategy is still greatly inferior to solutions involving the agent.  Unfortunately, the socially-best 
agent regime is very harmful to the firms: such a regime might suffer from significant efforts by firms to avoid 
such regulation (e.g. rent seeking) or to distort the information available for the agent to make optimising 
decisions.  However, two of the agent regimes, one where an agent faces a monopolist and takes all cross-network 
profit, and one where an agent faces a duopoly and takes an arbitrarily small share of cross-network profit, were 
shown to be equivalent to the social planner with the firm(s) strictly preferring the latter.  It turns out that these 
two regimes yield a network output less than 4% below the social planner‟s preferred regime, and the latter yields 
a profit to the firms which approaches the monopoly level for increases in 𝛽.  It follows, therefore, that regime D2 
which involves splitting up a network monopoly but imposing an agent who sets cross-network prices but earns 
an arbitrarily small share of associated profit is a potentially important compromise regime for all parties.   
 
END NOTE 
1. The proofs to all propositions follow from straightforward manipulations, use of L‟Hôpital‟s rule and/or are 
confirmed by the Figures.   
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 Figure 1 – Total Firm (Non-Agent) Profit by Regime Relative to Regime M1 (M1 = 1) 
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Figure 2 – Total Output by Regime Relative to Regime D3 (D3 = 1) 
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Figure 3 – Weighted Average Price by Regime Relative to Regime M1 (M1 = 1) 
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